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"This is a unique and extraordinary case."'
I. Introduction
In early 2010, the Obama administration is believed to have placed Muslim
cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi (also known as Anwar al-Alwaki) 2 on a Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) list of terrorists approved for targeted killing.3 While Presi-
dent Bush and President Obama have seemingly authorized many drone strikes to
target individuals in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen,4 conventional wisdom
suggests al-Aulaqi is the first American citizen to make an appearance on this
list.5  After several failed attempts, 6 the C.I.A.,7 in conjunction with a U.S.
t Professor and Thomas Mengler Faculty Scholar, University of Illinois College of Law. Thanks
to Dan Shalmon, Chris McIntosh, and Jenna Jordan for thoughtful comments.
I Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010) (opinion of Judge John Bates dismissing
the case).
2 Commentators differ on the translation of al-Aulaqi's name. For consistency's sake, this article
will employ the same spelling that the al-Aulaqi family used in filing the litigation.
3 See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.Supp.2d. at 11; see also Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of
American Cleric, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/ world/middleeast/
07yemen.html; Dana Priest, U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding Yemen on
Strikes, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/26/
AR2010012604239.html.
4 Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate Whether
There Is a 'Legal Geography of War,' in FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW 1, 1-2
(Peter Berkowitz ed., 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1824783.
5 Greg Miller, U.S. Citizen in CIA's Cross Hairs, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 2000, http://articles.latimes.
com/2010/jan/31/world/la-fg-cia-awlaki31-2010jan31.
6 Todd Eastham, Anwar al-Awlaki Targeted in U.S. Military Attack in Yemen, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, May 7, 2011, http://csmonitor.com./World/Latest-News-Wires/2011/0507/Anwar-al-Awlaki-
targeted-in-US-military-attack-in-Yemen (describing a failed May 5, 2011 attempt); Mark Mazzetti,
Drone Strike in Yemen Was Aimed at Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
Volume 9, Issue 1 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 159
Al-Aulaqi Debate: Litigating the Long War on Terror
counterterrorism unit,8 used a drone attack to successfully strike and kill Anwar
al-Aulaqi on September 30, 2011.9
Why did the government choose to target Anwar al-Aulaqi? Some terrorism
experts, like Bruce Hoffman, suggest that al-Aulaqi played a key operational role
in terrorist activities against the United States.' 0 Alleged activities that might
place al-Aulaqi within that criteria include a role in facilitating terrorist training
camps or planning terrorist attacks for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP)" as well as conspiring with Rajib Karim to blow up a U.S. bound
plane.12 That said, other scholars note the public evidence directly linking al-
Aulaqi to al-Qaeda operations "is slim."1 3 The government has thus far been
reluctant to disclose much information demonstrating these links, citing concerns
about intelligence gathering. 14 This reluctance to provide evidentiary support or
even a public justification has led many civil libertarians to fear that the govern-
ment may have instead listed him for pure speech acts or for other reasons insuf-
ficient to target an individual under domestic or international law.15
05/07/world/middleeast/07yemen.html (noting continued targeting efforts after the May 5, 2011 attempt);
Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, & Robert F. Worth, CIA Strike Kills U.S. Born Militant in a Car in Yemen,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-
killed-in-yemen.html (identifying several failed strikes and an aborted attempt by Yemen's counterterror-
ism commandos to force a Yemeni village to hand over al-Aulaqi).
7 The C.I.A. located al-Aulaqi after detaining and questioning one of his couriers. Colin Freeman et.
al, Strike on Voice of al-Qaeda Came after Clues from Courier, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 2, 2011, http://
www.highbeam.com/doc/P2-29771717.html (commenting on how Yemeni cooperation provided some
of the information needed to carry out the strike). Laura Kasinof, Yemen Notes Its Own Role in U.S.
Attack on Militant, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/world/middleeast/
yemen-notes-its-own-role-in-us-attack-on-militant.html.
8 Apparently, the CIA controlled both the aircraft and the decisions to fire. Greg Miller, Joint Strike
Is Latest Example of CIA-Military Convergence, WASH. PosT, Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/strike-on-aulaqi-demonstrates-collaboration-between-cia-and-military/2011 /
09/30/gIQAD8xHBLstory.html.
9 In so doing, the United States also killed Samir Khan, a naturalized American citizen who au-
thored and produced the online terrorist magazine Inspire. As he was not the target of the attack, but
merely collateral damage, his death does not raise the same legal questions. It is believed that Samir
Khan was never on the kill list. Mazzetti, Schmitt & Worth, CIA Strike Kills U.S. Born Militant in a Car
in Yemen, supra note 6.
10 Shaun Waterman, Al-Awlaki's Killing Seen as Major Blow, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2011, http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 I/oct/2/al-awlakis-killing-seen-as-major-blow/?page=all.
I' See generally Sarah Phillips, Al-Qaeda and the Struggle for Yemen, 53 SURVIVAL 95 (2011)
(describing the nature of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula).
12 Britain: Former Airline Employer Gets 30 Years in Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/europe/1 9briefs-ART-Britain.html.
13 Carol J. Williams, CIA Drone Strike Raises Debate, CHICAGO TRIB., Oct. 2, 2011, http://mobile.
chicagotribune.com/p.pa=rp&m=b&postld=930941 &curAbslndex=3&resultsUrl=DID%3D6%26DFCL
%3D 1000%26DSB%3Drank%2523desc%26DBFQ%3Duserld%253A54%26DFC%3Dcat I %252Ccat2
%252Ccat3%26DL.w%3D%26DL.d%3D 10%26DQ%3Dsectionld%253A6957%26DPS%3DO%26DPL
%3D3 (citing Micah Zenko, a Council on Foreign Relations fellow).
14 Id.
15 These other alleged activities that may have landed Anwar al-Aulaqi on the lists include: his
connections to two September 11, 2001 planners; Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Almindhar; a previous
arrest by Yemeni authorities for being part of an al Qaeda plot to kidnap a U.S. military attach6; the
inclusion of his name on a list of prisoners that al Qaeda affiliates sought to be released in Yemen; his
communications with Somalian terrorist group al-Shabaab praising their use of violence; a message urg-
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The government's decision to list an American citizen raises an important se-
ries of questions. At the time the government allegedly placed Anwar al-Aulaqi
on a kill list, remarkably little was known about the procedures for listing and
reviewing placements of individuals. How and under what authority did the gov-
ernment target Anwar al-Aulaqi? What legal standards guide the decision to list?
Who makes the initial decisions about listing? What evidentiary standards do
they use to determine if the legal standards are satisfied? Who reviews the deter-
minations and how frequently? What opportunity, if any, exists for the listing
individual to challenge his placement? Does the executive possess sole discre-
tion on these decisions or is it subject to Congressional or judicial oversight?
After al-Aulaqi's father learned of his son's predicament, he contacted the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Center for Constitutional Rights
(CCR) to file suit on his son's behalf and to find out the answers to the questions
raised above. 16 While international law scholars have been debating the general
permissibility of drone strikes,17 the specific targeting of Anwar al-Aulaqi raises
an additional set of legal questions, as he is an American citizen. Writ large, the
pressing issue is whether the executive branch possesses unreviewable authority
to order the targeted killing of an American that the President deems to be a
threat to the nation. This legal problem also implicitly raises the underlying pol-
icy question of whether such targeting is an effective strategy to win the war on
terror. Although the actual case has drawn to a close, first with the ACLU and
the CCR abandoning their opportunity for an appeal, and second with al-Aulaqi's
death, these questions remain important ones.
This case has larger implications as a consensus of experts agrees on the high
likelihood that the government has designated other Americans for targeting.'8
ing American Muslims to commit violent Jihad against other Americans; using the magazine Inspire to
threaten writers, journalists, and cartoonists; meetings with the Christmas day underpants bomber; and
meetings with Abdulmutallahab prior to the attempted attack on a Detroit airplane. See Bruce Hoffman,
American Jihad, 107 NAT'L INT. 17, 23-27 (May-June 2010); see also Charlie Szrom & Chris Harnsich,
Al Qaeda's Operating Environments: A New Approach to the War on Terror, CRITICAL THREATS PRO-
JECT OF THE Am. ENTER. INST. 1, 7, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/AQAM-final.pdf; see also
Gordon Lubold, Why is Anwar Al-Awlaki Terrorist 'No. ]?,' CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, May 19, 2010,
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ Foreign-Policy/2010/0519/Why-is-Anwar-Al-Awlaki-terrorist-No.-I
(describing Aulaqi's links to Major Nidal Malik Hassin who killed 13 people at Fort Hood, and Aulaqi's
inspirational role in Faisal Shahzad's attempted Times Square bombing).
16 Robyn E. Blumner, Some Basic Rights of an American, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010,
http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/some-basic-rights-of-an-american/l 113429.
17 See generally Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in
LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 346, 346-400 (Benjamin Wittes, ed.,
2009); see also Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan,
2004-2009, in SHOOTING To KILL: THE LAw GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt ed.,
forthcoming), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1501144; see also Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Attacks
Under the Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: Clearing the 'Fog of Law,' Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L.
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=1801 179.
18 See Brian Bennett and David Meeks, Still in U.S. Sights, CHICAGO TRIB., Oct. 2, 2011, http://www.
yellowbrix.com/index.nsp?sid=bp&pid=6&demo= 1 &story id=164214766&&ID=infobrix&scategory=
Defense (mentioning Adam Gadahn, a top propagandist, as a target); Nick Baumann, Judge Dismisses
Anwar al-Awlaki Targeted Killing Lawsuit, MOTHER JONES, Dec. 7, 2010, http://motherjones.com/mojo/
2010/12/judge-dismisses-anwar-al-awlaki-targeted-killing-lawsuit; see also Lendman, supra note 8 (not-
ing that "[iun late June, Deputy White House National Security Adviser for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, John 0. Brennan, acknowledged a hit list with dozens of other names, saying, 'There
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As home-grown terrorism grows, 19 the number of Americans listed will likely
increase as well. While some believe that al-Aulaqi's targeting is sui generis,20
others have gone so far as to suggest that the precedent may allow such attacks in
the United States or will encourage other countries to kill their citizens abroad.21
At the very least, our capacity to carry out such strikes against our own citizens
in similar locations has been enhanced with the creation of a new counterterror-
ism unit for Yemen and Somalia2 2 along with construction of a new air base in
Yemen. 23
Rather than attempt to resolve the numerous legal issues raised by the al-Au-
laqi litigation, 24 this short piece seeks to explain why the ACLU and CCR
brought this lawsuit and then ultimately abandoned it.2 5 In short, al-Aulaqi's
case demonstrates both the potential for, and the limitations of, litigation as a
strategy to curb executive authority during the so-called long war on terror. Even
though Judge Bates rightly noted that al-Aulaqi's case is a "unique and extraordi-
nary" one,26 many issues raised by the litigation speak to more run of the mill
terrorism cases. This article begins by identifying the ACLU and CCR's suc-
cessful challenge of a specific procedural burden, effectively ensuring greater
access to lawyers for many of those designated as terrorists. 27 This small victory
are, in my mind, dozens of US persons who are in different parts of the world, and they are very concern-
ing to us, not just because of the passport they hold, but because they understand our operational environ-
ment here, they bring with them certain skills, whether it be language skills or familiarity with potential
targets, and they are very worrisome, and we are determined to take away their ability to assist with
terrorist attacks.'" Brennan also stated, "'If an American person or citizen is in Yemen or in Pakistan or
in Somalia or another place, and they are (suspected of) trying to carry out attacks against U.S. interests,
they also will face the full brunt of a US response. What we need to do is to apply the appropriate tool
and the appropriate response."'); but see Raffaela Wakeman, The Kill or Capture List, LAWFARE, http://
www.lawfareblog.com/2011/10/the-kill-or-capture-list/ (Oct. 6, 2011, 3:21 PM) (suggesting that some
U.S. officials indicated Gadahn would not be listed as he was "not directly involved in plotting attacks").
19 See Alex Wilner & Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learn-
ing: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization, 22 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE AND
SECURITY 33, 33 (2010), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14781150903487956.
This, of course, assumes that some homegrown terrorists will spend time outside the United States.
20 Op-Ed., A Rare Act, Killing of al-Awlaki Accords with Sound Legal Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1,
2011, http://articles.boston.com/20 11-10-01/bostonglobe/302334261_al-awlaki-al-qaeda-navy-seal.
21 See Matt Apuzzo, American Drone Kills American Al-Qaeda, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB., Oct 1,
2011 (available on Lexis Nexis); see also Scott Shane, Coming Soon: The Drone Arms Race, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/sunday-review/coming-soon-the-drone-arms-
race.html (noting that while only the United States, Israel, and Britain have engaged in drone strikes,
more than 50 countries have unmanned aerial vehicles which could be equipped with weapons including
China, Russia, Iran, India, and Pakistan); but see Kenneth Anderson, What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is
Coming, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 10, 2011 3:19 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-
drones-arms-race-is-coming (suggesting that UAV technology and weaponization would have developed
even in the absence of U.S. drone use).
22 Greg Miller, Joint Strike Is Latest Example of CIA-Military Convergence, supra note 5.
23 Laura Kasinof & Alan Cowell, U.S. Drone Strike Kills Qaeda Leader, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 1,
2011 (available on Lexis Nexis).
24 See generally Chesney, infra note 73.
25 The timely appeal period had expired. Benjamin Wittes, No Appeal in al-Aulaqi, LAWFARE, http://
www.lawfareblog.com/2011/02/no-appeal-in-al-aulaqi/ (Feb. 22, 2011, 1:55 PM).
26 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, supra note 1.
27 75 Fed. Reg. 234, 75904 (Dec. 7, 2010) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 594, 595, and 597).
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aids many of those seeking access to the courts, not just American citizens. 28 In
contrast, Part II of this article notes the ACLU and CCR's general failures in
accomplishing their immediate litigation goals. Their efforts to expand the stand-
ing doctrine and narrow the application of sovereign immunity, state secrets, and
political question doctrines were largely futile. Yet, Part III suggests the ACLU
and CCR's real goals may have been the lawsuit's extra-legal consequences and
contributions. While they were unable to obtain a judicial review of the execu-
tive branch's behavior, this part documents how they leveraged the litigation to
provoke and influence a public debate over certain aspects of the war on terror.
As detailed below, the lawsuit allowed the ACLU and CCR to raise and initiate
the framework for legal and policy questions about the targeting of American
citizens. In the wake of al-Aulaqi's death, this framework is bearing some lim-
ited fruit as the push for greater transparency over legal standards for and review-
ability of targeting decisions increases in strength and the demand for a
rethinking of the policy wisdom of pursuing a targeting policy grows more
fervent.
II. Eliminating Pre-litigation Barriers to Terrorism Lawsuits
In order to make litigation more viable not only for al-Aulaqi, but also for
many other terrorism suspects who wish to challenge the government's authority,
the ACLU and CCR chose to address a pre-existing regulatory scheme that limits
legal representation of "specially designated global terrorists." 2 9 In 2003, the
U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) passed a regulation
prohibiting lawyers from defending certain accused terrorists pro bono without
explicit governmental permission.30 Thus, while Nasser al-Aulaqi originally re-
tained the ACLU and CCR on his son's behalf, OFAC's subsequent decision to
name Anwar al-Aulaqi a "specially designated global terrorist" prohibited further
legal representation until OFAC decided to grant his attorneys a license.31
Thus, in the complaint filed by the ACLU in ACLU v. Geithner,32 the two
non-profits challenged the government's licensing policy as an unconstitutional
violation of their "First Amendment right to represent clients in litigation consis-
tent with their organizational missions,"3 3 and a violation of due process and
separation of powers by "depriving a U.S. citizen of the ability to obtain repre-
28 Id.
29 ACLU, CCR and ACLU Receive License From OFAC to Pursue Challenge to Targeted Killing,
AMER. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Aug. 4, 2010, http://www.clu.org/national-security/ccr-and-aclu-receive-
license-ofac-pursue-challenge-targeted-killing.
30 31 C.F.R. 594.506(a) (2001). OFAC promulgated regulations to implement this order, which re-
quires specific licenses for persons whose property or interests are blocked under the regulations. Id.
President Bush issued an order blocking the "property of foreign persons determined by the Secretary of
the Treasury to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for. . .acts of
terrorism." Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
31 OFAC labeled al-Aulaqi as such on July 16, 2010. ACLU and CCR v. Geitner, ACLU, Dec. 17,
2010, http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-and-ccr-v-geithner.
32 Complaint ACLU v. Geithner, No. 10-CV-1303 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 3, 2010).
33 Id. at 3.
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sentation in litigation against the United States in U.S. Courts." 34 Soon thereaf-
ter, not only did OFAC grant the ACLU and CCR the specific license to
represent al-Aulaqi,35 but it also voluntarily revised its rules and regulations to
eliminate the licensing requirement for attorneys seeking to represent clients who
have had their assets frozen as terrorists. 3 6 This decision on the part of an execu-
tive agency represents a real victory for the ACLU and CCR against potential
future licensing delays or denials. At the very least, those individuals who have
been designated terrorists can now freely hire lawyers and begin to navigate both
the court and administrative system.
III. Failing to Achieve Direct Litigation Goals
Viewed narrowly, the ACLU and CCR pursued some very specific litigation
goals as embodied in their requested relief. First, they sought a declaration that
both the Constitution and International Law prohibited the government from car-
rying out targeted killings outside of armed conflict except as a last resort to
protect against "concrete, specific, and imminent threats" of death or serious in-
juries.3 7 Relatedly, they further asked for an injunction prohibiting the targeted
killing of al-Aulaqi outside the narrow confines of the aforementioned declara-
tion.3 8 Finally, they requested an injunction "requiring the government to dis-
close the standards under which it determines whether a U.S. citizen can be
targeted for death." 39 Ultimately, the court provided none of the requested relief,
nor did it even engage in a merits discussion of these requests.
Viewed more expansively, Al-Aulaqi's case also presented these non-profits
with an opportunity to push for a broad interpretation of standing in certain types
of terrorism cases. Individuals who wish to challenge their placement on these
targeting lists, as well as other suspected terrorists living abroad who have had
their assets frozen, are very unlikely to surrender themselves simply to enforce
their legal rights. Thus, the ability for third parties or other parties in interest to
stand in for them is quite important for pursuing litigation and challenging the
very authority of many of these determinations. As a prudential matter, courts
can construe next friend and third party standing broadly, but Judge Bates deter-
mined in this instance that the decision to hide from law enforcement, even under
threat of death, is an insufficient explanation for a failure to appear on one's
behalf.40 As Judge Bates decided that both domestic and international law would
require the U.S. government to allow al-Aulaqi to surrender peacefully, he con-
cluded mere fear of violence or death is insufficient to allow another to stand in
34 Id. at 4. They also challenged the regulations exceeding statutory authority by regulating non-
economic activity [as] "arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 10.
35 ACLU, CCR and ACLU Receive License, supra note 29.
36 75 Fed. Reg. 234, 75904 (Dec. 7, 2010) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 594, 595, and 597).
37 Complaint, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d I (D.D.C 2010) (No. 10-01469).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, supra note 1.
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for him as a "next friend."41 However, Professor Jack Goldsmith has noted that
Judge Bates' mention in dicta of the possibility of teleconferencing with attor-
neys from remote locations does provide some very slight solace for future plain-
tiffs. 4 2 Similarly, the court rejected third party standing because, among other
reasons, Judge Bates concluded Anwar al-Aulaqi's failure to bring suit or express
desire to litigate in American courts suggests his rights are not truly important to
him and that a third party representative would have divergent interests. 4 3
Even had they prevailed on the standing issue, other threshold matters loomed
large in this and many other terrorism cases challenging executive authority.
Moving from the most favorable to least favorable rulings, at best, the ACLU and
CCR got a draw on the military and state secrets privileges. While the govern-
ment argued that resolving the claims would require disclosure of protected in-
formation, they urged the court to resolve the case on other grounds, which it
did. 4 Accordingly, the litigation neither narrowed the scope of the state secrets
doctrine, nor clearly affirmed its widespread use. Similarly, the plaintiffs' re-
quested relief under the Alien Tort Statute was deemed inappropriate on sover-
eign immunity grounds. While this holding is a more clear loss for the ACLU
and the CCR, the court did at least decline to rule on whether the Administrative
Procedure Act's waiver of sovereign immunity would apply to it.4 5 Instead, the
court used its equitable discretion, leaving the more significant question of the
statute's applicability unanswered. 4 6
The threshold issue on which the ACLU and CCR suffered the most resound-
ing defeat was on the political question doctrine, which is likely to present formi-
dable obstacles for many cases brought during the long war on terror. Courts
invoke the political question doctrine as a constitutional preclusion mechanism
that forbids them from reviewing cases that turn on "policy choices and value
determinations" committed to the executive branch or Congress.4 7 In this case,
Judge Bates determined that Anwar al-Aulaqi's citizenship and claims of Consti-
tutional violations did not forestall the application of the political question doc-
trine.4 8 If the ACLU and CCR were hoping that al-Aulaqi's case might be
extraordinary and exceptional in the court's willingness to engage the merits in
the face of procedural escape hatches, their hopes were certainly dashed.4 9
41 Id. at 22.
42 Jack Goldsmith, What the ACLU and CCR Won in al-Aulaqi, LAWFARE, http://www.lawfareblog.
com/2010/12/what-aclu-and-ccr-won-in-al-aulaqi/#more-931 (Dec. 7, 2010, 6:32 PM); see Al-Aulaqi,
727 F.Supp.2d at 19; but see, Benjamin Wittes, Some Thoughts on Judge Bates' Decision, LAWFARE,
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/some-thoughts-on-judge-bates-decision/ (Dec. 8, 2010, 7:33 AM).
43 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.Supp.2d at 33-34.
44 Id. at 54.
45 Id. at 61.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 65.
48 Id. at 49.
49 Steven I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122, 123-26
(2001).
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As a result of these various determinations, the court chose not to address the
question of when the United States may target a particular foreign terrorist organ-
ization and its senior leadership. Nor did the court address several subsidiary
questions such as: whether the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) im-
plicitly authorizes the targeted killing of members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula; whether the AUMF covers AQAP members because they have suffi-
cient ties to al-Qaeda or because they are properly considered co-belligerents;
and what sort of ties the AUMF requires in terms of training, operations, and/or
shared membership for non-listed terrorist organizations? Similarly, the court
punted on related fact-specific questions of whether Anwar al-Aulaqi's role with
either al-Qaeda or AQAP would render him either a combatant or a civilian tak-
ing direct participation in hostilities. Relatedly, the court did not elucidate how
the standards for targeting might differ between combatants and civilians taking
direct participation in hostilities.
The conversation the ACLU and CCR seemed most interested in follows from
negative answers to the previous set of questions. If the AUMF does not prop-
erly cover al-Aulaqi, then does he, as a US citizen abroad, have a Fifth Amend-
ment right not to be deprived of life without due process? If so, what does the
content of that right include in this particular context? As mentioned earlier, the
ACLU and the CCR sought a declaration that in such instances both the Constitu-
tion and international law prohibit the government from carrying out targeted
killings except as a last resort to protect against concrete, specific, and imminent
threats of death or serious physical injury. They also sought a judicial role in
reviewing any executive determination that an individual's behavior satisfied
such criteria, (or at least the identification of what criteria the executive branch
may use). Yet, the court demurred - identifying these inquiries as complex pol-
icy questions in which it both lacks competence and manageable standards to
guide its answers.50
IV. Assessing Extra Litigation Goals: Generating and Framing a Public
Debate
While the ACLU and CCR lost big on paper, they may have achieved some
gains in instigating other checks on executive authority. These litigation-savvy
organizations must have recognized the very low probabilities of a judicial vic-
tory on most of the issues they raised. That said, they also know high profile
lawsuits garner attention for an issue, and, when managed correctly, can cause a
public outcry and allow the losing litigants to frame the debate.5' By bringing
this case, the ACLU and CCR spurred a heated public and academic debate on
the limits of the executive's authority to target individuals. For instance, the al-
Aulaqi suit prompted editorials in the New York Times,5 2 the Washington Post,53
50 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.Supp.2d at 52.
51 See generally Timothy Lytton, Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation: The Policymaking Role of Tort
Law, 39 CONN. L. REv. 809 (2007).
52 Op-Ed., Judicial Scrutiny Before Death, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes. com/
2010/12/13/opinion/13mon2.html.
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and many other widely circulated publications. 5 4 The debate also continued on-
line through spirited blog fights.55 The ACLU and CCR certainly succeeded not
only in creating a high profile debate, but also in introducing a new frame
through which the issues should be viewed and assessed. Although targeting is a
long-standing practice, the lawsuit serves as a mechanism by which the ACLU
and the CCR can tie a renewed moral outrage about its current incarnation to
specific legal hooks. Rather than starting from a national security perspective,
the lawsuit and its resulting discourse encourages the media, the public, and the
relevant policy actors to focus on constitutional, statutory, and international law
questions.56 By filing a lawsuit, the ACLU and CCR raised another issue not
previously a significant part of the public debate on targeting: whether the Presi-
dent should have unreviewable authority to carry out the targeted killing of an
American anywhere that the President deems to be a threat to the nation. This
forces a debate about whether unilateral executive authority will sufficiently pro-
vide the constitutional protections of due process and whether new, publically
reviewable constraints on executive authority need to be developed. The ACLU
and CCR posed these questions as necessary to create a set of rules not just for
al-Aulaqi, but also for future targets and future presidents.
It is worth noting that Al-Aulaqi's case is just one part of the ACLU's larger
legal strategy to challenge targeting policy and the secrecy surrounding it. For
instance, in January 2010, the ACLU used the Freedom of Information Act to
request documents related to the drone strikes.57 This request included any
records including "information about the legal basis in domestic, foreign, and
international law" for drone strikes as well as any information "regarding the
rules and standards that the Armed Forces and CIA use to determine where and
53 Op-Ed., Whether to Use Drones on Americans Linked to al-Qaeda, WASH. POST, Sept. 6,
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/05/AR2010090502877.html; Op-
ed., Should U.S. Citizens Who Join Forces with al-Qaeda Be Subject to Drone Strikes, WASH. POST, Sept.
6, 2010, at Al4 (this editorial is available on LexisNexis but is not available online); Anthony Romero &
Vincent Warrant, Op-ed., Sentenced to Death without Trial, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2010, at A19 (this
editorial is available on LexisNexis but is not available online).
54 See, e.g., David Cole, Breaking Away, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 2010, at 17; Philip Giraldi,
Deep Background, THE Am. CONSERVATIVE, Apr. 1, 2010, at 21; Kevin Williamson, Assassin in Chief -
The War on Terror Has Blinded the Right to a Disturbing Expansion of Executive Power, NAT'L REV.,
Nov. 1, 2010; Eric Posner, Dockets of War, NAT'L INTEREST, Mar- Apr 2011; Ben Lerner, Citizenship as
Sword, AM. SPECTATOR, Oct. 25, 2010; Alex Kingsbury, Can the CIA Put a U.S. Born al-Qaeda Figure
on Its Kill List, US NEWS, Sept. 7, 2010; see also Op-ed., Judicial Scrutiny Before Death, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2010, at 24.
55 See, e.g. John C. Dehn & Kevin Jon Heller, Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 175 (2011) (each author presented different sides of a debate); see also Kevin Jon Heller,
Ben Wittes' Unconvincing Hostage Taking Analogy, OPINIO Jutus (Sept. 3, 2010) http://opiniojuris.org/
2010/09/03/ben-wittes-unconvincing-hostage-taking-analogy/; Benjamin Wittes, A Response to Kevin
Jon Heller, LAWFARE, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/09/a-response-to-kevin-jon-heller/ (Sept. 4,
2010); David Rivkin & Lee Casey, The American Terrorist Obama Wants To Kill, THE DAILY BEAST,
Apr. 7, 2010, http://www.thedailybeast .com/articles/2010/04/07/the-american-terrorist-obama-wants-to-
kill.html.
56 Of course, whether this frame is the normatively preferable way to conceptualize these issues is
another inquiry entirely.
57 Michael Doyle McClatchy, Targeted Killing of al-Awlaki Debated, SPOKESMAN REV., Oct. 1,
2011, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/201 1/oct/01/targeted-killing-of-al-awlaki-debated/.
Volume 9, Issue I Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 167
Al-Aulaqi Debate: Litigating the Long War on Terror
when these weapons may be used, the targets they may be used against, and the
processes in place to decide whether their use is legally permissible in particular
circumstances." 58 In their letter, the ACLU raised the specific concern that U.S.
citizens might be targeted as one of the reasons supporting the release of infor-
mation. 59 In the subsequent litigation, Judge Rosemary Collyer granted summary
judgment for the CIA concluding they did not have to disclose any material. 60
She determined that acknowledging or releasing even the information limited to
the "scope, limits, oversight, and legal basis of this killing program" would im-
plicate sources and methods of intelligence gathering. 61 The other suits against
the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the Justice Department
continue, but they seem, like al-Aulaqi's suit, more influential in creating public
rather than judicial checks on executive action.
This section identifies four mechanisms by which the ACLU and CCR might
have deployed the al-Aulaqi litigation as part of a larger strategy to challenge
unfettered executive authority in the long war on terror. First, it raises the possi-
bility that the public pressure generated by the lawsuit would constrain the ad-
ministration's willingness or ability to engage in drone strikes against American
citizens. Such constraints could include the development and disclosure of the
legal limits on the executive's authority. Second, public pressure may instead
lead to a second or third best situation in which the government instead discloses
some of those legal limits by leaks. Third, this section notes that the litigation
induced public debate may encourage the legislature to become more involved in
targeting practices. Though such an involvement may lead to more rather than
less targeting, it does in some sense limit the power of the unilateral executive
and creates some democratic accountability. Finally, this section notes that the
litigation may have helped reinvigorate the policy debate about whether targeting
is a necessary or successful approach to conducting the long war.
58 Memorandum Opinion at 2, ACLU, et. al. v. Dep't of Justice, Civil Action No. 10-0436 (D.D.C.,
Sept. 9, 2011) available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdcel
1:2010cv00436/141218/34/0.pdf.
59 Id. at 4. The C.I.A. responded by issuing a letter neither confirming nor denying the existence of
any related records and asserting its legal defense against revealing such information. Notably, the C.I.A.
declined to explicitly raise the state secrets doctrine at any point in the FOIA litigation, though the
Washington Legal Foundation's amicus brief did assert it. In fact, the Washington Legal Foundation
argued that C.I.A. director Leon Panetta's arguments that the al-Aulaqi litigation raised state secret
problems was a reason the court should acknowledge the privilege in the FOIA case as well. Press
Release: Court Urged to Dismiss Request for CIA Records on Drone Attacks, WASH. LEGAL FOUNDATION
(Oct. 19, 2010) (available via Targeted News on Lexis Nexis).
60 The court found that releasing or even acknowledging the existence or nonexistence of records
would reveal correctly protected classified information. In so doing, Judge Collyer found that the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947 is a withholding statute. ACLU v. Dep't of Justice, No. 10-0436 at 6-8
(D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2011). The court further concluded that opening the records could "reveal information
on the CIA's internal structure and its capabilities and potential interests and involvement in/operation of
the drone program." Id. at 10.
61 Id. at 11-15.
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A. Direct Executive Checks through Public Pressure
Given the reluctance of judges to engage these issues on the merits, any ulti-
mate review of the individual listing determinations seems likely to be embedded
in the executive rather than in the judiciary. Even so, the ACLU and CCR seem
to be using lawsuits as part of a larger strategy to push for more transparent
executive review, or at the very least an acknowledgement and elucidation of
existing review standards. While the lawsuits themselves did not directly result in
a judicial order calling for executive constraints or transparency, litigation can
provide a frame from which the public and policy makers can pressure for such
limits.
That said, the ACLU and CCR's generation of legal attention and framing
failed in the most immediate sense to alter the executive's behavior. Despite the
lawsuits, the CIA continued to target al-Aulaqi until it ultimately struck and
killed him. Nor did the litigation and ensuing debate force a public account of
the legality of this action. Thus far, the administration has been largely silent on
the legal grounds and evidence for the targeting of al-Aulaqi.62 At best, the gov-
ernment has made a few modest nods towards a public justification by describing
al-Aulaqi as someone who could be lawfully targeted. 6 3 Yet, the administration
has provided no evidence to support its assessment nor any meaningful explana-
tion of which facts, if true, would allow his targeting.
In fact, the number and scope of issues on which the administration has re-
mained silent is staggering.6 To begin with, the administration has not even
acknowledged the existence of a drone program. Unsurprisingly then, it has also
been close-lipped on the existence of a targeting list, the names of those on the
list, the legal and evidentiary standards by which someone is placed on the list,
and any review processes that might take place both after listing and after suc-
cessful targeting. Human rights groups are reading the administration's silence
as a deliberate decision, 6 5 particularly in light of the more detailed explanation
62 Paul Harris & Jamie Doward, How US Tracked Objective Troy to his Death, THE GUARDIAN, Oct.
2, 2011, (describing President Obama's reluctance to provide any operation details, including his role in
the chain of command).
63 Court Urged to Dismiss Request for CIA Records on Drone Attacks. Laura Kasinof & Alan
Cowell, U.S. Drone Strike Kills Qaeda Leader, supra note 23. Obama also referred to al-Aulaqi as the
leader of al Qaeda's external operations. Matt Apuzzo, American Drone Kills American Al-Qaeda, supra
note 21. Relatedly, Obama's Press Secretary also stated that al-Aulaqi "was also very demonstrably and
provably involved in operational aspects of AQAP." White House Press Secretary Jay Carney, News
Briefing (Sept. 30, 2011). White House Spokesman Robert Gibbs had previously identified al-Aulaqi as a
regional commander for AQAP. Matt Apuzzo, American Drone Kills American Al-Qaeda, supra note
21.
64 Victoria Nuland, State Department Spokesperson, State Department News Briefing (Sept. 30,
2011) (referring questioners to ask the Justice Department for answers to questions about the legality of
the strike); White House Press Secretary Jay Carney, News Briefing (Sept. 30, 2011) (refusing to answer
questions about the circumstances surrounding al-Aulaqi's death including questions about whether any
proof of al-Aulaqi's operational role will be made available to the public).
65 Scott Wilson, No Safe Haven Anywhere in the World, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.
pressherald.com/news/nationworld/obama-uses-high-risk-tactics-against-terrorists_2011-10-01 .html.
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provided after the boots on the ground operation leading to Osama bin Laden's
death.66
In the wake of al-Aulaqi's death, many in the domestic and foreign press have
questioned the legal precedent.67 And notably, many have also mentioned the
incident in reference to the ACLU's lawsuit in making their objections. 68 Even
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has argued that the "U.S. government did not
prove the accusations against [him], and did not present evidence against [him] in
their unjust laws of their freedom." 69 Unfortunately, few politicians on either
side of the aisle have seriously questioned the legality of the decision,70 with
even Obama's political rivals lauding the outcome.71 If restraint and overt trans-
66 Adam Baron, Al-Awlaki's Death Deprives al-Qaida of Key Recruiting Voice, MCCLATCHY NEWS
BUREAU, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/09/30/125728/us-born-cleric-anwar-al-awl-
aki.html.
67 For example, see Neil Steinberg, Suddenly They Trust Obama to Kill People, CHICAGO SUN TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.suntimes.com/news/steinberg/7999840-452/suddenly-they-trust-obama-to-kill-
people.html; Op-Ed., Al-Awlaki and the Bounds of Power, NEWSDAY, Oct. 3, 2011, at A34; Adam Bates,
Judged and Assassinated, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/no-jury-
for-mr-awlaki/2011/09/30/gIQAraTOGLstory.html; Op-Ed., Terrorist Assassination Exposes Hypocrisy
of Obama Policies, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 1/sep/30/
awlaki-the-model-moderate-muslim/; Op.ed, Yasir Qadhi, An Illegal and Counterproductive Assassina-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/opinion/sunday/assassinating-al-
awlaki-was-counterproductive.html; Maajid Nawaz, Commentary, By Abandoning Our Own Values We
Reinforce The Extremists, OBSERVER, Oct. 2, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 1/ oct/Ol/drone-
killing-anwar-al-awlaki; Matt Apuzzo, American Drone Kills American Al-Qaeda, supra note 21; Matt
Apuzzo, Drone Strike on Two Americans Raises Questions, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.
armytimes.com/news/2011/09/ap-drone-strike-on-2-americans-raises-questions-0930 11/; Scott Shane,
Judging a Long Deadly Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/
american-strike-on-american-target-revives-contentious-constitutional-issue.html; Michael Doyle
McClatchy, Targeted Killing of al-Awlaki Debated, SPOKESMAN REV., Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.spokes-
man.com/stories/20l 1/oct/01/ targeted-killing-of-al-awlaki-debated/; Sophie Quinton, No Due Process in
Awlaki's Killing, Civil Libertarians Worry, NAT'L J., Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.nationaljournal.coml
nationalsecurity/no-due-process-in-awlaki-s-killing-civil-libertarians-worry-20110930; Op-ed., Ed
Husain, U.S. Shouldn't Have Killed al-Awlaki, CNN OPINION, Sept. 30, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/
2011-09-30/opinion/opinionhusain-awlaki-killing- Il-al-awlaki-al-zawahiri-yemeni-
prison?_s=PM:OPINION.
68 Donna Leinwand Leger, Al-Awlaki Strike Did Not Kill Bombmaker; Critics Say Drone Hit Disre-
gards U.S. Law, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 2011 at 6A; Carol J. Williams, CIA Drone Strike Raises Debate,
CHICAGO TRIB., Oct. 2, 2011 at C29; Peter Finn, Awlaki Assassination Triggers Legal Debate, BosToN
GLOBE, Oct. 1, 2011, http://articles.boston.com/2011-10-01/news/30233533_I-yemen-awlaki-military-
force; Op-Ed., Targeting Those Who Target Us, DENVER POST, Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.denverpost.
com/opinion/ci_19014973; Scott Shane, In Cleric's Killing An Issue of Due Process, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/l P1-198217615.html.
69 Thomas Jocelyn, AQAP Confirm Anwar Al-Awlaki Killed in U.S. Drone Strike, THE LONG WAR J.,
OcT. 10, 2011, http://www.longwarjournal.orglarchives/201 1/10/al-qaeda_ confirmsan.php.
70 Jackie Calmes, Success Battling Terrorists, but Scant Glory for It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/10/03/us/politics/for-obama-success-battling-terrorists-seems-to-mean-little.
html?pagewanted=all (noting Dennis Kucinich as one of the few Democrats to respond publicly who
"objected that the killing was 'wrong legally, internationally, and morally."); Stu Bykofsky, Home
Grown Terrorists Deserved to Die, THE PHILADELPHIA DAILY, Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/03/us/politics/for-obama-success-battling-terrorists-seems-to-mean-little.html?pagewanted=al
(noting that Republican Ron Paul criticized the action, but most of the far left has remained silent);
Sophie Quinton, No Due Process in Awlaki's Killing, Civil Libertarians Worry, supra note 67.
71 Anissa Haddadi, Al-Awlaki's killing: Obama's Proof he is Better at Fighting the War Against
Terror than Bush?, INT'L Bus. TIMES NEWS, Sept. 30, 2011, http://uk.ibtimes.comlarticles/222881/
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parency were the measures by which one ought to judge the success of the al-
Aulaqi lawsuit, it again appears to be a failure.
B. Creating Conditions for Indirect Transparency: Government By Leaks
All that said, the ACLU and CCR successfully contributed to an atmosphere
that encouraged the administration to at least leak information about the legal
standards governing the targeting of an American citizen and about constraints
on targeting more generally. Between the al-Aulaqi lawsuit and the FOIA law-
suit, the ACLU and CCR generated momentum to push for answers to at least
three different types of related questions. 72 First, what are the legal standards for
listing and how are those abstract standards interpreted on the ground? Second,
who makes those legal determinations and who reviews them? Third, what are
the evidentiary standards by which those determinations are made? And finally,
what deference or review exists for those evidentiary requirements? Although
the government has not provided anything approaching full disclosure on any of
these questions, we now at least seem to have more information about Al-Au-
laqi's listing and the listing procedure in general.
For instance, at the time Anwar al-Aulaqi appeared on the list, the government
provided very little public detail on how it selected anyone, much less an Ameri-
can citizen, for listing.7 3 After the news of al-Aulaqi's placement on the list,
Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, did articulate a relevant factor in
listing as "whether that American is involved in a group that is trying to attack
us, whether that American is a threat to other Americans. . .We don't target
people for free speech. We target them for taking action that threatens Ameri-
cans or has resulted in it."'7 But much more information has been revealed in the
wake of al-Aulaqi's death as several sources have come forward. For instance,
former head of the Office of Legal Adviser Jack Goldsmith recently commented
that in order for the government to place anyone on the kill list, high level agency
lawyers along with high level policy makers must assess the legal and political
20110930/al-awlaki-s-killing-obama-s-proof-he-is-better-at-fighting-the-war-against-terror-than-bush.
htm.
72 While proving such a causal relationship is often difficult, it does seem that the ACLU and CCR
request for transparency and accountability may have helped motivate the leaks. Of course, the govern-
ment may have chosen to leak information in the absence of either political pressure or the lawsuits, but
given both the intensity and quality of the pressure, it would be reasonable to think a relationship does
exist.
73 The State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh did "address the factors that the United States
considers in connection with specific targeting decisions including the imminence of the threat," but not
the evidentiary thresholds for when someone makes the list. See Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed?
Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, Y.B. OF INT'L
HUMANITARIAN L. 1, 10 (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1754223; see also
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.
state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
74 See Stephen Lendman, Targeted Assassinations: Challenging U.S. Policy, ATL. FREE PREss, Aug.
6, 2010, http://www.atlanticfreepress.com/news/1/13632-targeted-assassinations-challenging-us-policy.
html; see also Eli Lake, 'Permission' Needed to Kill U.S. Terrorists, WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 4, 2010, http://
www.washingtontimes.comlnews/2010/feb/04/permission-needed-to-kill-american-terrorists/.
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risk, approve the action, and inform the Congressional intelligence committee
about the intelligence community's role in the operations.75 News reports also
contend that the C.I.A. general counsel along with White House counsel76 review
individual determinations every six months to ensure that targets continue to sat-
isfy the legal standards.77 In addition, some evidence suggests the entire Na-
tional Security Council reviews the determination if an American citizen is
listed.78
Moreover, in the wake of al-Aulaqi's death, the public learned that the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel issued a classified memorandum detailing
its understanding of the legality of al-Aulaqi's strike.79 While the administration
has not officially declassified and released the memo, it seems those at the high-
est levels may have allowed or even encouraged its leakage. At the very least,
some officials who have read it anonymously described its contents to NYT re-
porter Charlie Savage. According to these sources, Office of Legal Counsel at-
torneys David Barron and Martin Lederman served as primary drafters, writing
the memo after deliberations and consultations with high-level lawyers from the
Pentagon, the State Department, the National Security Council, and intelligence
agencies.80 Under this account, the memo assesses an executive order banning
assassinations, domestic prohibitions on murder, constitutional protections, and
the laws of war and concludes none barred the targeting of al-Aulaqi.81
While these leaks provide some vague sense of the decision-making process,
the memo leaves as many questions as answers. For instance, the memo is not
thought to reveal the identity of those who decide to put targets on the kill list
and no public record has been made of their reasoning or decisions. 82 Nor is the
75 Op.-Ed, Jack Goldsmith, A Just Act of War, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/01/opinion/a-just-act-of-war.html.
76 Op-Ed., David Ignatius, Risks of Drone Addiction, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2011, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/opinions/the-price-of-becoming-addicted-to-drones/2011/09/21/ gIQAovp4lK-story.
html.
77 Peter Finn, In Secret Memo, Justice Department Sanctioned Strike, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-securitylaulaqi-killing-reignites-debate-on-limits-of-ex-
ecutive-power/2011/09/30/gIQAxlbUAL story.html.
78 Op-Ed., David Ignatius, Risks of Drone Addiction, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2011, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/opinions/the-price-of-becoming-addicted-to-drones/2011/09/21/glQAovp4lK-story.html.
79 Peter Finn, In Secret Memo, Justice Department Sanctioned Strike, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2011,
supra note 77; Scott Shane & Thom Shanker, Yemen Strike Reflects U.S. Shift to Drone as Cheaper War
Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/world/awlaki-strike-shows-us-shift-
to-drones-in-terror-fight.html?pagewanted=all. The arguments within the memo are believed to have con-
strained decision-making; for instance, the C.I.A. may have delayed the strike until Al-Aulaqi was away
from a populated area. Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 9, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-memo-made-legal-
case-to-kill-a-citizen.html?pagewanted=all.
80 Allegedly, no writer raised a dissenting opinion as to the legality of killing al-Aulaqi. Peter Finn,
In Secret Memo, Justice Department Sanctioned Strike, supra note 77.
81 Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, supra note 79.
82 Bruce Ackerman, On the Presidential Assassination ofAmerican Citizens, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 9,
2011 7:17 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/10/on-presidential-assassination-of.html (observing that
we do not know how much information midlevel operatives who make list recommendations provide to
National Security Council panels or how that evidence is weighed, nor does the president make the final
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memo alleged to have grappled with the specific evidence that such individuals
assessed to put al-Aulaqi on the list. Given that the memo is merely leaked,
rather than declassified, the public and scholars do not have the opportunity to
see or question the arguments and precedents that inform the writers' reasoning
and conclusions. Nor can they be sure that the leaks accurately represent the
actual positions taken by the administration.
Many, including the ACLU, scholars, and politicians, have now called for the
declassification of the memo and an ensuing public debate over its contents.83
Some explicitly note the absence of the kind of judicial review called for in al-
Aulaqi's case as a reason why the memo's disclosure is so important. 4 Even
those supportive of targeting like the former head of the House Intelligence Com-
mittee85 and Former State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger III have
asked the White House to make public the secret memos. 86 Others like Professor
David Cole have suggested that a public justification of the legal grounds upon
which the decision to target al-Aulaqi rested is necessary to keep both interna-
tional and domestic support for on-going targeting.87 Given the government's
skittishness about compromising intelligence sources and methods, some have
limited their call for disclosure for legal reasoning only," while others also want
an assessment of the facts on the ground. Whether the administration will release
the memo remains to be seen, but we do appear to know more than we did before
decision- he merely retains veto power); Jonathan Turley, Death Panel: Obama Delegates Hit List to
Panel of Unnamed Officials, JUNATHANTURLEY.ORG (Oct. 20, 2011 4:16 PM), http://jonathanturley.org/
2011/10/06/death-panel-obama-delegates-hit-list-to-panel-of-unnamed-officials/.
83 Op-Ed., Explaining the Awlaki Strike, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/administration-should-do-more-to-defend-the-awlaki-strike/2011/10/04/glQASHEbOLstory.
html (calling for a release of the memo); Op-Ed., Define the Rules of Engagement, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Oct. 5, 2011, at A13 (calling for a public justification), Op-Ed., Karinne Combes, The Killing of
Anwar al Awlaki, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 5, 2011, at A19 (calling for a public debate); Steve Huntley,
Obama Right to Target al-Awlaki, CHICAGO SUN TIMEs, Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.suntimes.cominews/
huntley/8010361-452/obama-right-to-target-al-awlaki.html (supporting the targeting but also the release
of the memo so long as it does not compromise intelligence gathering or military operations); Peter Finn,
Legal Experts Ask for Release of Awlaki Memo, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world /national-security/political-legal-experts-want-release-of-justice-dept-memo-supporting-kill-
ing-of-anwar-al-awlaki/2011/10/07/gIQABCV9TL-story.html (noting that several democrats and former
George W. Bush administration officials have now called for a release of the memo).
84 Jack Goldsmith, Release the al-Aulaqi OLC Opinion, Or Its Reasoning, LAWFARE, http://www.
lawfareblog.com/2011/10/release-the-al-aulaqi-olc-opinion-or-its-reasoning/ (Oct. 3, 2011 7:45 a.m.)
(calling for the release of the OLC memo since a judicial review of the action is not going to happen and
suggesting that release of the memo would allow a fuller vetting of the constitutional arguments made
and it may "describe the limits of presidential power in this context").
85 Joby Warrick, Cheney Says Obama Owes an Apology after Awlaki Killing, WASH. POST, Oct. 3,
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the lawsuit about the rules that govern the determination of listings and of the
listings of Americans in particular.8 9 Both the government's decision in how
much information to reveal and the manner in which the revelations have oc-
curred are likely deeply unsatisfying to the ACLU and CCR, but perhaps better
than nothing.
C. Revitalizing Congressional Checks
Another way in which al-Aulaqi may move the decision-making away from an
unfettered executive is by revitalizing the discussion about amending the AUMF
to cover nations like Yemen or groups like AQAP, as well as organizations that
share some goals with al-Qaeda. Of course, such a debate does not guarantee
that Congress will limit the executive. In fact, Congress may decide to expand
the scope of the AUMF and with it provide a greater reach to the executive.90
While this may not have been the ACLU and CCR's first order preference, as a
second order matter, such amendments have the non-trivial benefit of enhanced
democratic legitimacy and greater clarity about the scope of the war on terror.
D. Encouraging Policy Debate over Targeting
Filing al-Aulaqi v. Obama also provided the ACLU and CCR with a platform
to address policy issues of whether targeting is necessary, sufficient, or prefera-
ble to other strategies to ensure national security. Media coverage and, to some
extent, the government has presented the decision as a binary one: either allow
the executive unreviewable authority to target al-Aulaqi or do nothing. Yet, the
lawsuit allowed the ACLU and CCR to present another option to the court, to the
executive, and to the public. This third (and clearly lawful) approach is to use
law enforcement to attempt an arrest. 91 Yemen had already arrested al-Aulaqi
once in 2006.92 Though al-Aulaqi's re-arrest would have presented many logisti-
cal burdens, U.S. diplomatic pressure could have been quite effective in persuad-
ing Yemen to arrest al-Aulaqi if the opportunity had presented itself. For
instance, although Yemen refused for a long time to extradite al-Aulaqi, as of
October 2009, they agreed to charge him and subsequently sentenced him in
89 Most interestingly, the memo is said to require the capture of an American citizen if feasible.
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ghanistan. Rob Crilly, Warlord Snared, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 2, 2011 at 27. One could imagine
Congress expanding the AUMF to include them.
91 Complaint, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d I (D.D.C 2010) (No. 10-01469).
92 Scott Stewart, Why Anwar al-Awlaki Is NOT Bin Laden's Successor, Bus. INSIDER (May 12, 2011,
1:08 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-anwar-al-awlaki-is-not-bin-ladens-suc-e-sor-2011-5?utm
source=feedburner&utmmedium=feed&utm -campaign=feed%3A+businessinsider+%28Business+In-
sider%29 (stating al-Aulaqi was only released at the behest of the United States which did not believe at
the time it had "sufficient evidence" to pursue legal action. One might find it worrisome that the execu-
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absentia. 9 3 At the time of his death, the Yemeni police were authorized to arrest
him by any means necessary. 94 They were also well equipped to handle the post-
arrest phase as they are successfully prosecuting other American al-Qaeda sus-
pects like Al-Hajj.9 5 Presumably, the intelligence required to locate al-Aulaqi for
targeting ought to be sufficient to locate him for an arrest as well. Of course, an
arrest presents different and much more significant risks than drone targeting
because it requires people to put themselves in harm's way. Despite this risk, the
successful use of "boots on the ground" in getting to Osama bin Laden shows the
United States is capable of executing such a plan even with well-protected, high-
value targets.
Moreover, law enforcement strategies to incapacitate specific suspected ter-
rorists include more than arrests and prosecutions. The United States has long
been using other law enforcement mechanisms to dry up funding, seize assets,
and generally make it more difficult for terrorists to operate. 96 The national se-
curity frame often overlooks or obscures these tools, while the ACLU and CCR's
refraining can help bring them to the forefront.
Finally, implicit in this discussion of lawful and unlawful approaches to deal-
ing with al-Aulaqi is a prior policy question about whether emphasizing leader-
ship decapitation is the right strategy in the war on terror.97 Will targeting
succeed? In this context, success means more than the first order question of
whether the United States can find and eliminate the targets it seeks which it is in
fact rather good at. 98 But rather, if the executive branch does eliminate these
targets, will terrorism directed at the United States and its allies subside?99
While the empirical literature here is still in its nascent stages, work from politi-
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cal scientist Jenna Jordan suggests that successfully targeting high-level opera-
tives rarely causes organizational collapse.' 00 In fact, she suggests terrorist
organizations effectively replace even very high-level members.o'0 Her work
also suggests that religiously-motivated organizations engaged in terrorist activi-
ties are more likely to fade away when states choose not to pursue a decapitation
strategy.10 2 International security scholar Robert Pape has similarly suggested
that killing key members of religiously motivated groups can be particularly
counter-productive because it may cause splintering with increasingly smaller
numbers of groups that attempt more and more attacks. 03 Likewise, many ques-
tion the benefits of killing al-Aulaqi as he may not have been a key player in al-
Qaeda's hierarchyl04 or similarly they question the focus on killing Bin Laden
given the decentralized nature of al-Qaeda and its affiliates.' 05 That said, others
suggest that some individuals play such an important recruiting and organiza-
tional role that they cannot be replaced.10 6 Regardless of where one falls on this
issue, the executive implemented this strategy without a thorough public debate.
By emphasizing the legal standards for targeting, the ACLU and CCR helped
invigorate a discussion of available options and strategies for combating high-
level terrorists.
V. Conclusion
Although the resolution of both the legal and the policy debate, has ultimately
been left to the executive, the ACLU and CCR helped make these questions part
of the larger landscape of public discourse by filing al-Aulaqi. While raising
constitutional and statutory questions brings the discussion within a legal frame-
work, the related media and academic commentary encourages a more thorough
public vetting of the policy issues implicated by targeting. One of the most im-
portant lessons of al-Aulaqi may be that while the judiciary remains cautious
about treading on executive prerogatives, even seemingly hopeless litigation can
generate the conditions for some public check on the executive during the long
war on terror.
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